People are rational. Most people, most of the time, have reasons for their actions. The reasons might be based on faulty logic, or incorrect information, or superstition, or simple emulation, or strong desire, but they are reasons nonetheless. We often use the term rational to refer to an educated notion of logical, well informed, soundly based reasoning. But more broadly, rational behavior may be said to result from the application of whatever cognitive resources are available to a particular person. And what appears to you or me as an irrational phobia is the other person's considered opinion.
Rational behavior is distinguished from what is popularly called instinctive behavior. When certain external stimuli produce a consistent or predictable response, the action is said to be instinctive. The behavior of animals, and especially the lower animals, is likely to be instinctive rather than rational. The behavior of a certain species of worm is said to be fully predictable. Its response to external stimuli has been studied and fully described. A compulsive, subconscious habit in people seems akin to this predictable, unthinking response. But experts tell us that even subconscious behavior in people is learned by experience.
The behavior of people in matters of food and sex, for example, is motivated by something more primitive than rational thought, but our response even to these basic appetites is also heavily influenced by cultural norms. In fact we insist on it. Our laws and social conventions require thoughtful and conforming behavior. Nonconforming behavior is unacceptable when it is thoughtless or instinctive, and even more unacceptable when it is premeditated.
We learn from experience that bees can sting. We learn to draw back immediately from a buzzing bee. Our reaction to the bee is directed by our subconscious mind. We do not need to think, consciously and rationally, that the bee must be avoided because it might sting. Yet when asked why we drew back suddenly and spilled the drink, we give a reason for our action: There was a bee on my hand. In this sense our actions are nearly all rational. We have our reasons, and we know what they are. If asked for a reason, we can supply one.
Monday, May 18, 2048
Sunday, May 19, 2047
Four. Every person has a unique outlook.
Every person has a unique mind, and a unique outlook. The outlook animates the personality, and the outlook informs our thoughts and words and actions. To know another person is to know something of her outlook. The thoughtfully considered outlook of a philosopher has been called a worldview. But let us define outlook by saying that everybody has one.
People acquire information through observation. Observation is defined broadly as all means of learning. Information, broadly, is the content thus acquired. Information includes the logical framework or the habits of mind that associate bits of information, to the extent that these are learned. A person’s outlook reflects acquired information, learned habits of mind, and innate characteristics of that person’s mind and body.
Love and trust are part of a person’s outlook. The object of love or trust may be selected by process as innate as childbirth, or by the more deliberate process of observation. In personal relationships, observation will be understood to include the whole experience of the other, and every fact and image and impression that the experience introduces to the mind. The distinction between passive or objective observation and lived experience is often blurred. Objective observation is a learned discipline, and a very useful one in science for example, but here we will not assume that observation and experience are always distinct. Both are means of learning. Both inform the outlook. The mind does not necessarily deconvolute the two.
In summary, observation refers to everything brought to the mind by the senses. The senses inform the mind, and the mind forms its outlook. Sight and hearing, language and music, color and shape and dimension, pain and trauma, scent and touch and embrace influence the mind through the senses. Observation in this general sense may be a shared and interactive experience, rather than a private or passive one.
Information resides in the mind. Of course we could speak of information lying forgotten in a book, or information waiting to be discovered in the physical world. But the information that informs the outlook resides in the mind. Information is taken to encompass a broad spectrum of things that can (in some circumstance) be consciously recalled, from salient facts to ideas and impressions and logic and associations. All these things are learned, if they are acquired through the senses.
In the creative act, the mind acquires an idea, or a vision, that is not delivered by the senses. Perhaps it is a simple thing, a variation on a common theme, a designer’s new line, a new hypothesis on cause and effect. But it is original; its source is not purely observation but also imagination.
People acquire information through observation. Observation is defined broadly as all means of learning. Information, broadly, is the content thus acquired. Information includes the logical framework or the habits of mind that associate bits of information, to the extent that these are learned. A person’s outlook reflects acquired information, learned habits of mind, and innate characteristics of that person’s mind and body.
Love and trust are part of a person’s outlook. The object of love or trust may be selected by process as innate as childbirth, or by the more deliberate process of observation. In personal relationships, observation will be understood to include the whole experience of the other, and every fact and image and impression that the experience introduces to the mind. The distinction between passive or objective observation and lived experience is often blurred. Objective observation is a learned discipline, and a very useful one in science for example, but here we will not assume that observation and experience are always distinct. Both are means of learning. Both inform the outlook. The mind does not necessarily deconvolute the two.
In summary, observation refers to everything brought to the mind by the senses. The senses inform the mind, and the mind forms its outlook. Sight and hearing, language and music, color and shape and dimension, pain and trauma, scent and touch and embrace influence the mind through the senses. Observation in this general sense may be a shared and interactive experience, rather than a private or passive one.
Information resides in the mind. Of course we could speak of information lying forgotten in a book, or information waiting to be discovered in the physical world. But the information that informs the outlook resides in the mind. Information is taken to encompass a broad spectrum of things that can (in some circumstance) be consciously recalled, from salient facts to ideas and impressions and logic and associations. All these things are learned, if they are acquired through the senses.
In the creative act, the mind acquires an idea, or a vision, that is not delivered by the senses. Perhaps it is a simple thing, a variation on a common theme, a designer’s new line, a new hypothesis on cause and effect. But it is original; its source is not purely observation but also imagination.
Sunday, May 20, 2046
Five. A lion waits.
A lion waits in tall grass for the approaching prey. At some moment she will spring and chase. Intuitively we doubt that the lion’s action is instinctive, like a spider’s rushing toward the motion of a trapped fly. We suppose that the lion deliberates much as we would in deciding when to act.
We might suppose that the lion gives chase when she can imagine a successful chase. Informed by experience and the senses, the lion envisions the chase before she springs. We could describe this envisioning with language that describes a human athlete’s performance. The athlete imagines clearing the bar, envisioning the required action in space and time, and then acting. We cannot really know what it is like to be a lion, but it is tempting to believe that the lion, like one of us, is a conscious being with mental apparatus that envisions the action before taking it. Then the lion must have an imagination, however limited. The development of skill requires imagination, just as creativity requires imagination.
If the lion has no imagination whatever, and cannot envision the action before taking it, then she must simply react when some accumulation of stimuli reaches a tipping point. The stimuli might include sight, scent and sound; motion, size, speed, proximity, separation, and so forth. This gives us a quite different and less appealing idea of what it is like to be a lion. Even a worm responds to stimuli. A clever observer might develop an algorithm that predicts what a lion will do in response to such stimuli. The algorithm would be useful in building a robotic lion, but we would doubt that the real lion is like our robot.
There is a middle way, in which the lion learns from experience but still perhaps does not imagine or think about the action before taking it. The lion retains in its subconscious mind an image of conditions preceding every chase, and that image is associated with success or failure in the chase. The lion’s internal “springing algorithm” is created and modified and fine-tuned by all of its experience. Yet this educated lion still springs when immediate stimuli tell it to spring. Imagination and decision may have no role. Conscious thought may have little or no role. And this model would also describe many of the actions of people as well. Like other animals, we learn by association of the outcome with the conditions leading up to the outcome. This is the way we learn about the stinging bee.
The middle way is probably closest to the truth, but still we do not know what it is like to be a lion. The middle way describes the way people behave in many situations, even when they imagine they are being thoughtful and logical.
We might suppose that the lion gives chase when she can imagine a successful chase. Informed by experience and the senses, the lion envisions the chase before she springs. We could describe this envisioning with language that describes a human athlete’s performance. The athlete imagines clearing the bar, envisioning the required action in space and time, and then acting. We cannot really know what it is like to be a lion, but it is tempting to believe that the lion, like one of us, is a conscious being with mental apparatus that envisions the action before taking it. Then the lion must have an imagination, however limited. The development of skill requires imagination, just as creativity requires imagination.
If the lion has no imagination whatever, and cannot envision the action before taking it, then she must simply react when some accumulation of stimuli reaches a tipping point. The stimuli might include sight, scent and sound; motion, size, speed, proximity, separation, and so forth. This gives us a quite different and less appealing idea of what it is like to be a lion. Even a worm responds to stimuli. A clever observer might develop an algorithm that predicts what a lion will do in response to such stimuli. The algorithm would be useful in building a robotic lion, but we would doubt that the real lion is like our robot.
There is a middle way, in which the lion learns from experience but still perhaps does not imagine or think about the action before taking it. The lion retains in its subconscious mind an image of conditions preceding every chase, and that image is associated with success or failure in the chase. The lion’s internal “springing algorithm” is created and modified and fine-tuned by all of its experience. Yet this educated lion still springs when immediate stimuli tell it to spring. Imagination and decision may have no role. Conscious thought may have little or no role. And this model would also describe many of the actions of people as well. Like other animals, we learn by association of the outcome with the conditions leading up to the outcome. This is the way we learn about the stinging bee.
The middle way is probably closest to the truth, but still we do not know what it is like to be a lion. The middle way describes the way people behave in many situations, even when they imagine they are being thoughtful and logical.
Saturday, May 20, 2045
Six. Chipping stone for millions of years.
Hominids, we are told, have been chipping stone for millions of years. Their product for millions of years was something like an ax without a handle. The hand ax functioned as an extension of tooth and claw, or tooth and nail, and became necessary for the creature’s survival. The stone tool was very crude at first. Stone-chipping skills improved slowly, over many thousands of generations, until rather handsome hand axes were being produced toward the end of the era.
Stone-chipping skill requires the conscious foresight that we have called a primitive imagination. Striking the work just here, with the anvil held just so, will remove a flake that advances the shape toward the envisioned end product. Having envisioned the blow, the primate must execute it with effective hand-eye coordination learned by experience. To envision the action, and the result of the action, and then to perform it, is a definition of skill. For a very long period of time there is evidence of the gradual development of skill in hominids. There is little concurrent evidence of creativity, with its greater demands on the imagination.
We may doubt that the refinements of stone axes in the later period were necessary for Darwinian survival of the species. We are free to imagine that a stone-chipping hominid produced a well-made piece, like some we have found, because he had the skills to do so, and because he rather liked the result. His fellow primates may have liked the result as well, and rewarded his efforts. A little imagination, plus requisite skill, produced an artifact that was valued for reasons other than simple functionality. We call this art. We recognize such later pieces today as tools made with great skill to achieve an imagined ideal form and appearance. The craftsman was proud of his work.
We can be sure these tools were not produced by rote, like the spider’s web or the bird’s nest. We know what it is like to be a toolmaker. He may have been mute and dull, but he focused on his work and made each blow different from the last, as he thought necessary to produce the form he desired.
Again, birds build nests, but birds do not innovate. Nests of a species are like the nests of the previous generation. Change is glacial. Birds do not imagine new designs or introduce new techniques into their nest-building.
Similarly we are given to understand that the early makers of stone axes did not innovate or invent. So far as we know they did not make a spear head and attach it to a shaft. They did not make shell necklaces or bone sewing needles. They did not carve figurines or decorate objects. They did not bury their dead. Evidence of these higher levels of imagination and innovation and creativity belongs to a relatively recent time. An expansion of art and artifacts began some tens of thousands of years ago and is still continuing. The capable imaginations which produced this variety of found artifacts probably developed (experts currently believe) from a small beginning in Africa during the preceding hundred thousand years or so. This period is associated with the rise of modern man, Homo sapiens. It is associated with the advent of people.
Stone-chipping skill requires the conscious foresight that we have called a primitive imagination. Striking the work just here, with the anvil held just so, will remove a flake that advances the shape toward the envisioned end product. Having envisioned the blow, the primate must execute it with effective hand-eye coordination learned by experience. To envision the action, and the result of the action, and then to perform it, is a definition of skill. For a very long period of time there is evidence of the gradual development of skill in hominids. There is little concurrent evidence of creativity, with its greater demands on the imagination.
We may doubt that the refinements of stone axes in the later period were necessary for Darwinian survival of the species. We are free to imagine that a stone-chipping hominid produced a well-made piece, like some we have found, because he had the skills to do so, and because he rather liked the result. His fellow primates may have liked the result as well, and rewarded his efforts. A little imagination, plus requisite skill, produced an artifact that was valued for reasons other than simple functionality. We call this art. We recognize such later pieces today as tools made with great skill to achieve an imagined ideal form and appearance. The craftsman was proud of his work.
We can be sure these tools were not produced by rote, like the spider’s web or the bird’s nest. We know what it is like to be a toolmaker. He may have been mute and dull, but he focused on his work and made each blow different from the last, as he thought necessary to produce the form he desired.
Again, birds build nests, but birds do not innovate. Nests of a species are like the nests of the previous generation. Change is glacial. Birds do not imagine new designs or introduce new techniques into their nest-building.
Similarly we are given to understand that the early makers of stone axes did not innovate or invent. So far as we know they did not make a spear head and attach it to a shaft. They did not make shell necklaces or bone sewing needles. They did not carve figurines or decorate objects. They did not bury their dead. Evidence of these higher levels of imagination and innovation and creativity belongs to a relatively recent time. An expansion of art and artifacts began some tens of thousands of years ago and is still continuing. The capable imaginations which produced this variety of found artifacts probably developed (experts currently believe) from a small beginning in Africa during the preceding hundred thousand years or so. This period is associated with the rise of modern man, Homo sapiens. It is associated with the advent of people.
Saturday, May 21, 2044
Seven. She knows what she likes.
Why does the female of some avian species prefer the red-feathered male? Biologists answer with a story about chemistry. His red-feathered display produces a response in the retina of the eye of the female that sends chemical signals to her brain, causing her to behave in a receptive way that produces more red-feathered males, and more susceptible females. An engineer might call this a stable feedback loop. Once begun, the cyclic phenomenon tends to reinforce and perpetuate itself. Red reinforces red in the life cycle of the species. Others might call it sexual selection. She knows what she likes.
How did the ability to speak develop in those early stone-chippers with their limited imaginations? We are delightfully free to speculate, because there is so little hard evidence as to why or even when people began to speak. Could it be that the female of the species, or the male, simply liked and responded to the sound of vocalization? Is it not still true that spoken sounds in an intimate or social setting are an attractive or seductive or influential characteristic of a person? Could it be that the variety of sounds once even exceeded the variety of meaningful words? Did speech emerge as art and music before grammatical communication became necessary to survival? Did the anatomy for speech result from sexual selection of those who made music and small talk?
And finally, is preference in the mind of a person, or a community, simply a matter of deterministic chemistry, as it is reported to be in simpler species? In answer to this question, materialists would say yes. Dissenters would say no, there is also an immaterial dimension to the human mind. In other words, there is no accounting for taste. We do not need anything in our genetic code telling us to prefer the red or the blue or the tall and dark or the skillful or the creative. Our individual and community tastes are conditioned by far more than genetics. Yet tastes could still influence genetics through sexual selection.
How did the ability to speak develop in those early stone-chippers with their limited imaginations? We are delightfully free to speculate, because there is so little hard evidence as to why or even when people began to speak. Could it be that the female of the species, or the male, simply liked and responded to the sound of vocalization? Is it not still true that spoken sounds in an intimate or social setting are an attractive or seductive or influential characteristic of a person? Could it be that the variety of sounds once even exceeded the variety of meaningful words? Did speech emerge as art and music before grammatical communication became necessary to survival? Did the anatomy for speech result from sexual selection of those who made music and small talk?
And finally, is preference in the mind of a person, or a community, simply a matter of deterministic chemistry, as it is reported to be in simpler species? In answer to this question, materialists would say yes. Dissenters would say no, there is also an immaterial dimension to the human mind. In other words, there is no accounting for taste. We do not need anything in our genetic code telling us to prefer the red or the blue or the tall and dark or the skillful or the creative. Our individual and community tastes are conditioned by far more than genetics. Yet tastes could still influence genetics through sexual selection.
Friday, May 22, 2043
Eight. Outlook, again.
Every person has a different outlook. There is much discussion of the factors in nature and nurture that combine to make each of us unique. And if many people seem to be alike in certain respects, it is often discovered that those similarities are cultural rather than universal among people.
We have little difficulty in distinguishing one person we know (unless a twin) from six billion others. But we do perceive that people everywhere have some universal characteristics, which we commonly refer to as human nature. For example, people everywhere tend to be self-centered. Sociologists might describe concentric circles, with myself at the center, followed by my children, my spouse, my kin, my friend, my tribe, and so forth, and with nearness to the center being a measure of caring or concern or empathy or love.
Conversely, great distance from the center can be envisioned as a measure of enmity, or hostility, or disregard, or hatred, or xenophobia. The people at greatest distance from those near our center are those whom we demonize. The word implies a willingness, or even a duty, to kill or destroy or defeat people viewed as evil, or as a threat to life itself.
Extreme views like this can be recognized and rejected by thoughtful people, but the capacity to demonize other people seems to be a part of human nature. Certainly it is part of our history and part of the outlook of many people on earth today. Belligerence is a part of human heritage.
The Christian ethic calls for a deliberate rejection of those circles of hatred and self-centeredness. Christians and perhaps others are called upon to love their enemies; to resist not evil; and to regard the other as more important than the self. We are commanded to oppose the primal imperative called human nature. A reason is given: If we are children of God, we may not draw circles to exclude those whom God has not excluded.
We have little difficulty in distinguishing one person we know (unless a twin) from six billion others. But we do perceive that people everywhere have some universal characteristics, which we commonly refer to as human nature. For example, people everywhere tend to be self-centered. Sociologists might describe concentric circles, with myself at the center, followed by my children, my spouse, my kin, my friend, my tribe, and so forth, and with nearness to the center being a measure of caring or concern or empathy or love.
Conversely, great distance from the center can be envisioned as a measure of enmity, or hostility, or disregard, or hatred, or xenophobia. The people at greatest distance from those near our center are those whom we demonize. The word implies a willingness, or even a duty, to kill or destroy or defeat people viewed as evil, or as a threat to life itself.
Extreme views like this can be recognized and rejected by thoughtful people, but the capacity to demonize other people seems to be a part of human nature. Certainly it is part of our history and part of the outlook of many people on earth today. Belligerence is a part of human heritage.
The Christian ethic calls for a deliberate rejection of those circles of hatred and self-centeredness. Christians and perhaps others are called upon to love their enemies; to resist not evil; and to regard the other as more important than the self. We are commanded to oppose the primal imperative called human nature. A reason is given: If we are children of God, we may not draw circles to exclude those whom God has not excluded.
Friday, May 23, 2042
Nine. Language and imagination.
Some thousands of generations ago, language and imagination seem to have crossed a threshold somewhere in a local community of stone-chippers, and a few of them passed from a period of stability to a period of instability. We began to think and speak and imagine in ways formerly unknown. This capability once initiated would quickly reinforce itself and grow stronger.
Language and imagination enabled the creation of new categories in the circles of our outlook. The language and symbols and artifacts and habitats and practices of others became different from our own, and those who were different we distrusted and pushed away. Belligerent tendencies were amplified by new criteria for identification of friend and foe.
Language and imagination enabled us to envision and talk about and think about the reality out of sight, beyond the horizon or over the ridge. We thought about the alien tribe who lived there. We imagined, often correctly, that they demonized us, because we demonized them. We imagined, again correctly, that they might act to allay their fears by attacking us. If our more primitive and unimaginative ancestors had their motives to attack another clan or species, we now had new motives and new enemies among our own kind.
Language and imagination were great assets in warfare, and particularly in leadership. Our leader could articulate our fears and focus our response. Our leader could know his less imaginative enemy and anticipate his actions. Our leader could make plans and communicate them to his warriors. Our leader could think and speak on his feet. Our evil but slow-witted enemy would be defeated and destroyed. Our stone-chipping opponents have weapons, but we have strategies as well. The surviving tribe was the tribe able to produce leaders and followers more proficient in the use of language and imagination.
This kind of thinking about the past, this exercise in imagination and language, can serve to explain how people got to be so smart so fast, before we left the cradle of our origin, and incidentally before the advent of race. It might explain why people have been and still are so quick to identify friend and foe, ourselves and the others, sometimes with deadly intent, and other times with merely competitive attitude, using a wide variety of cultural cues. Xenophobia and belligerence were not the sin of Adam, but perhaps they were the sin of Cain.
Language and imagination enabled the creation of new categories in the circles of our outlook. The language and symbols and artifacts and habitats and practices of others became different from our own, and those who were different we distrusted and pushed away. Belligerent tendencies were amplified by new criteria for identification of friend and foe.
Language and imagination enabled us to envision and talk about and think about the reality out of sight, beyond the horizon or over the ridge. We thought about the alien tribe who lived there. We imagined, often correctly, that they demonized us, because we demonized them. We imagined, again correctly, that they might act to allay their fears by attacking us. If our more primitive and unimaginative ancestors had their motives to attack another clan or species, we now had new motives and new enemies among our own kind.
Language and imagination were great assets in warfare, and particularly in leadership. Our leader could articulate our fears and focus our response. Our leader could know his less imaginative enemy and anticipate his actions. Our leader could make plans and communicate them to his warriors. Our leader could think and speak on his feet. Our evil but slow-witted enemy would be defeated and destroyed. Our stone-chipping opponents have weapons, but we have strategies as well. The surviving tribe was the tribe able to produce leaders and followers more proficient in the use of language and imagination.
This kind of thinking about the past, this exercise in imagination and language, can serve to explain how people got to be so smart so fast, before we left the cradle of our origin, and incidentally before the advent of race. It might explain why people have been and still are so quick to identify friend and foe, ourselves and the others, sometimes with deadly intent, and other times with merely competitive attitude, using a wide variety of cultural cues. Xenophobia and belligerence were not the sin of Adam, but perhaps they were the sin of Cain.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
